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Most discussions of ethics, justice and foreign policy have emerged from International 
Relations1 theory and have centred on the ‘high’ politics of conflict, diplomacy and 
inter-state relations. By contrast, the possible ethical implications of the ‘low’ politics 
of international commerce have attracted less attention. This is both surprising and 
unwarranted, for not only does the contemporary international political-economy 
provide the material bed-rock within which the practice of international relations 
unfolds, but the manner in which individual states are incorporated into it has 
profound ethical and pragmatic implications. For example, critics of the contemporary 
international order complain – with some justification – that the structures of 
governance which determine economic and political outcomes in an increasingly 
integrated and ‘global’ system are designed to further the interests of ‘the North’.2 
Similarly, it has become painfully obvious that poverty and development failure 
provide the seedbed for much of the world’s most intractable conflicts. Consequently, 
political-economy is – or should be – at the centre of policy-oriented debates about 
the sources of conflict and disorder, and about the normative basis of a system that is 
seen as incapable of alleviating such stresses at best, and of actively contributing to 
them at worst. 
 
Many of these tensions and contradictions are subsumed under the all-encompassing 
rubric of ‘globalisation’. For all its overuse and imprecision, globalisation does 
succinctly draw attention to a number of processes that firstly, are central elements of 
the evolving international political-economy;  secondly,  are reflective of the 
dominant ideas about how the international economic system ought to be run; and 
which, finally, highlight the profoundly differential outcomes that characterise a 
supposedly global system. In order to determine whether a more ethical approach to 
economic policy is possible at either the national or the transnational level, therefore, 
it is necessary to examine the evolution and nature of the contemporary global 
system; indeed, it is necessary to consider the inherent limitations of a capitalist 
international order, as such a system necessarily places limits on the sort of ethical or 
normatively based outcomes that are compatible with a market ordered system. 
 
Consequently, the paper is organised in the following way: initially, I consider why 
we should be concerned about developing a just or ethically-informed economic 
system in the first place. This is not a trivial issue: there is a notable absence of such 
considerations in many of the most influential accounts of economic development, 
which assume that the resolution of what are seen as essentially ‘technical’ rather than 
                                                 
1 In what follows I shall employ the conventional distinction between the discipline of 
International Relations and its more general un-italicised practice. 
2 This is a less than satisfactory shorthand to describe the industrialised, ‘developed’, 
rich, OECD countries on the one hand, and the poor, ‘developing’ countries of the 
South, on the other. 
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moral problems will occur through appropriate policy rather than normative 
reorientation. Following this, I examine the evolution of the increasingly ubiquitous 
capitalist economy and consider whether its essential ‘logic’, and the way it is  
currently managed by powerful international financial institutions (IFIs), is 
compatible with a more ethically grounded economic order. I sketch the way 
contemporary patterns of ‘global governance’ have developed and argue that, 
although the IFIs could potentially  be key components in regulating a more ethical 
international economic order, their present role as champions of a dominant, 
neoliberal3 orthodoxy makes them incapable of performing such a role. In the absence 
of IFIs dedicated to promoting greater economic equality and justice I argue that – 
contra the cosmopolitan position4 that has emerged in International Relations – states, 
for all their failings and problems, remain crucial sites of resistance to a dominant 
economic orthodoxy that offers little hope for the developing world, and potentially 
critical mechanisms for accelerating development. Paradoxically, however, the 
limitations to the statist position become evident when I briefly examine Australian 
foreign economic policy in the final section. 
 
Economic Justice: Who Cares, Why Bother? 
 
The foolproof -  universal and unshakably founded – ethical code will never be found; 
having singed our fingers once too often, we know now what we did not know then, 
when we embarked on this journey of exploration: that a non-aporetic, non-ambivalent 
morality, an ethics that is universal and ‘objectively founded’ is a practical 
impossibility… (Bauman 1993: 10). 
 
Zygmunt Bauman captures much that is distinctive about the modern - not to say 
‘post-modern’ – sensibility: we live in a world devoid of the comforts of religion, 
grand narratives or the ontological certainties of former eras, and must come to terms 
with the contingent and the particular as best we can. This is a profound challenge 
under any circumstances, but it raises especially troubling issues in an economic 
context, as the international economic system is characterised by forces and processes 
that, paradoxically enough, have become increasingly universal. While there are still 
important debates about precisely what ‘globalisation’ is and when it may be taken to 
have begun,5 there is general acceptance that we do live in a period characterised by a 
far greater degree political and economic inter-connectedness, something that is 
driven by broadly similar processes (Higgott 1999). Certainly, individuals, 
companies, and even countries may be integrated into global processes in different 
ways with different capacities to respond to the challenges this presents, but many of 
the qualities of globalisation are now not only widely recognised, but presented as the 
definitive, ubiquitous determinants of domestic and foreign policy (see Reinicke 
                                                 
3 ‘Neoliberalism’ refers to the ascendancy of the market-oriented policy paradigm that 
emerged following the demise of Keynesianism in the 1970s. It advocates small 
governments and the unimpeded operation of market forces. See Richardson (2001). 
4 Pogge (1992: 48-49) suggests that cosmopolitan positions share three elements: first, 
individualism, or a claim that individual human beings rather than tribes, nations or 
states are the ‘ultimate units of concern’; second, universality, or the claim that 
concern should attach to all human beings equally; and generality, or the claim that 
this status has global relevance. 
5 See Held et al (1999) for a comprehensive discussion of the issues. 
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1999). In such an environment, there is a potentially fundamental disconnect between 
the construction of a personalised, contingent and particular morality and the 
workings of an evermore global political-economy. 
 
This matters because economists (and the policymakers they influence) are generally 
not troubled by the sorts of epistemological niceties that have come to concern moral 
philosophers. On the contrary, much economic discourse assumes a theoretical rigour 
and  ‘objectivity’ that would make a physicist blush, and is relentlessly technocratic 
and problem-oriented in its approach as a consequence.6  Of course, this ideational 
influence only extends to ‘mainstream’ economic thought (Heilbroner 1990), but it 
does help to explain the rise to prominence of ‘neoliberal’ ideas and the 
marginalisation of alternatives.  At a time when the conventional economic wisdom 
suggests that markets rather than people are the optimal determinants of economic 
outcomes, when governmental ‘intervention’ in economic activities is actively 
discouraged, and when individuals are seen as responsible for their own economic 
well-being, the influence of neoliberal economic ideas presents a potentially fatal 
initial obstacle to more progressive or ethically informed alternatives. Consequently, 
if alternative ideas are to be taken seriously in such circumstances, they must be 
compelling and feasible. 
 
Making morality 
 
It needs to be recognised at the outset that in the dominant, orthodox account of 
economic activity, the unequal distribution of economic resources is not necessarily a 
bad thing. Indeed, part of the dynamism of the capitalist system is the competitive 
struggle for scarce goods; wealth accrues to those most able to utilise economic 
resources ‘efficiently’. As Buzan et al (1998: 95 [emphasis in original]) remind us, 
‘actors in a market are supposed to feel insecure’. Whatever we may feel about the 
desirability of intrinsic inequality, insecurity and competitiveness, as a system for 
actually producing wealth, capitalism - despite all its undoubted shortcomings - has 
surpassed alternative systems with seemingly greater theoretical claims to equity and 
sustainability (van Parjis 1995).  
 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, some of the most important attempts to develop critiques of 
the existing order and rationales for alternatives, have been primarily concerned with 
the distribution, rather than the creation of wealth. One of the most influential 
formulations of this kind emerged from contractarian political theory. Charles Beitz 
(1979: 128) contends that the distributive obligations between individuals, which he 
assumes arise because of their state-based, common citizenship, ‘ought to apply 
globally’. In the absence of an overarching, religiously or ideologically-inspired grand 
narrative against which such a claim might be tested, it must remain just that – a 
claim, albeit one that many might find intuitively and normatively appealing. But 
when juxtaposed against the ‘national interest’ routinely invoked by policymakers the 
world over to justify all manner of policy initiatives, appeals to the moral conscience 
of politicians can look hopelessly naïve. Policymakers can argue – rightly perhaps – 
that their primary obligations are to the politically demarcated populations they claim 
                                                 
6 As Robert Cox  (1981: 128 [emphasis in original]) famously observed, ‘theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose’ – a point that seems to have eluded much 
of the economics profession. 
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to represent.  And yet, Beitz (1979: 149) makes the important observation that ‘in an 
interdependent world, confining the principles of social justice to domestic societies 
has the effect of taxing poor nations’. In other words, not only may one nation 
actually benefit materially from another’s poverty, but this has the potential to corrode 
the moral integrity of the beneficiary.  
 
However, there are a number of assumptions underpinning Beitz’s analysis that 
appear questionable: ongoing economic integration has rendered the idea of discrete 
‘national economies’ highly problematic, for reasons I shall shortly explain. Even 
more pertinently for the purposes of this discussion, the idea that clearly developed 
notions of justice with distinctive national characteristics exist at all, let alone actually 
influence policy, sounds more like wishful thinking in an era characterised by 
relentless international economic competition and an apparent narrowing of public 
policy options (Cerny 1996). Nevertheless, while the ‘vague but unmistakable sense 
of global moral community’ identified by Parekh (2003: 11) may yet be in its infancy, 
many policymakers feel obliged to deplore the glaring and growing disparities of 
incomes and life-chances that have been revealed - and arguably intensified - by 
processes associated with globalisation (see Rodrik 1997). Whether human beings 
have an inherent ‘right’ to anything simply as a consequence of being human is 
ultimately a matter of opinion rather than fact (Rorty 1993), but for those who seek to 
achieve more equitable distributions of economic resources it provides a legitimation 
for such claims themselves and the basis for a ‘counter hegemonic discourse’ at a time 
of apparently narrowing public policy options. At the very least, the attempt to 
conceptualise rights within the reality of an international economic system is a 
marked improvement on some of the most influential explorations of ethical questions 
that are predicated on exclusively national foundations.7 
 
By contrast, Shue’s (1980) influential conception of certain minimal ‘basic rights’ is 
especially useful as it includes both economic and international dimensions. In 
addition to the more conventional right to ‘security’ or freedom from violence and 
political oppression, Shue claims that ‘subsistence’ or economic rights are a 
fundamental requirement of human existence. Intuitively, this makes good sense: 
without basic economic rights, which Shue (1980: 23) argues should include 
‘unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, 
and minimal preventive public health’, there is little prospect that other rights can be 
enjoyed. True, the desire for unpolluted air looks ambitious given that rising living 
standards have been overwhelmingly associated with industrialisation, but the rest of 
the list looks remarkably modest. This is an especially important consideration given 
the significance of economic development as a prerequisite for other forms of political 
and social development (Sen 1999). Without such development, grander hopes for 
democratisation, enhanced security and the encouragement of more globally-oriented 
forms of citizenship will be stillborn.  
 
There is clearly a major debate about whether and how such economic development 
goals could be achieved. However, given that there are widely accepted estimates 
about the impact that even relatively modest redistributions of resources might have 
on current levels of deprivation, then the moral and pragmatic case for action becomes 
                                                 
7 Path-breaking as Rawls’ (1971)  analysis of distributive justice issues plainly was, it has been 
extensively criticised because of its restricted, nationally demarcated basis (see Beitz 1979). 
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more compelling (see Singer 2002, ch. 5). As Pogge (2002: 144) has persuasively 
argued: 
 
 By continuing to support the current global order and the national policies that shape 
and sustain it without taking compensating action toward institutional reform or 
shielding its victims, we share a negative responsibility for the undue harms they 
forseeably produce. 
 
In other words, ‘we’ share some sort of collective responsibility for failing to address 
violations of rights which are ascribed importance. If we accept the logic of this 
argument – and this is, of course, ultimately a normative judgement – the key issue is 
how the existent order, which permits such violations, might be changed and what 
obstacles might prevent it. This is involves an exploration of contemporary modes of 
global governance and the capitalist system they seek to manage. 
 
Governing Global Capitalism 
 
A more equitable international economic order would have to emerge from the 
existent structures of what is now essentially a global capitalist system. In order to 
gauge the prospects for such a radical and unprecedented development, it is important 
to sketch some of the key qualities associated with globalisation, contemporary 
systems of international governance, and the fundamental qualities of extant capitalist 
economic structures.  
 
Capitalism has a number of qualities that present potentially fundamental obstacles to 
the development of more ethical or equitable policies. Capitalism’s basic structure is 
widely recognised, but often neglected or overlooked by would-be reformers. It is not 
necessary to be a Marxist to recognise that the private ownership of economic assets 
generates a basic class structure and inescapable asymmetries of power and 
opportunity.8 Even the rise of modern joint stock companies and more complex 
patterns of ownership and control have done nothing to alter the underlying 
differences between those that control capital and those that do not. Indeed, one of the 
most striking features of the contemporary international economic system is the 
remarkable rise to prominence of multinational corporations which are frequently 
larger than many national economies, and which fundamentally constrain the choices 
open to individual states as a consequence. Even though there are a variety of 
different forms of capitalist organisation (Coates 2000), with differing modes of social 
and corporate organisation, this does not alter the essential, ubiquitous character of 
market-based commodity production or the inequitable distribution of economic 
resources it implies. 
 
It is also important to recognise that the historical development and spatial extension 
of capitalism has generated other enduring, structurally embedded inequalities. 
Western Europe’s initial economic development and subsequent rise to political 
prominence was made possible by the systematic exploitation of the ‘new world’ (see 
Blaut 1993). Bullion from Latin America, and African slaves to work Europe’s 
                                                 
8 However, scholars operating in a Marxist tradition do provide the most compelling 
analyses of the capitalism’s potential tensions and contradictions. See Milliband 
(1991). 
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colonial plantations, not only provided ‘the West’ with the vital kick start to underpin 
rising living standards and industrialisation, but they also locked much of the rest of 
the world into subordinate positions in an emerging international economy. Europe’s 
‘first mover’ advantages ensured that European countries frequently occupied 
dominant positions in the emerging hierarchy of global production (Beeson and Bell 
forthcoming). True, other spaces opened up for a limited number of subsequent 
countries in North America and parts of East Asia, but the uneven nature of the 
development process was established early and has proved insurmountable in much of 
Africa, South Asia and Latin America. Importantly as far as debates about reform are 
concerned, even where development has occurred, it has generally been as a 
consequence of state intervention, rather than as a result of international cooperation 
or cosmopolitan initiatives (see Weiss and Hobson 1995). Moreover, many critics of 
the contemporary system argue that the emerging structures of global governance are 
unlikely to address this problem. On the contrary, they are part of the problem.  
 
Global governance 
 
The emergence of the massive transnational corporations noted above is but one - 
albeit crucial - part of the globalisation story. Less visibly, massive flows of direct and 
indirect forms of investment, and the concomitant rise of international financial 
markets, have fundamentally changed the way formerly discrete national economies 
are integrated with each other. The history of the technological innovations that 
permitted such integration and the political initiatives that facilitated it have been 
extensively debated and recounted, and are by now sufficiently well understood to 
need little elaboration here.9 What is important for the purposes of the present 
discussion are the emergent structures of governance that seek to manage and 
facilitate global processes (Rosenau 1997; Held and McGrew 2002). Such structures 
and patterns of interaction are important for two reasons: first, if human beings are to 
collectively address transnational questions of equity and distribution it is clear that 
institutions to facilitate international cooperation will be a necessary part of the 
process. Second, such institutions already exist at a variety of levels and are currently 
helping to shape economic outcomes. The problem, of course, it that such institutions 
are often considered to be perpetuating rather than alleviating international inequality. 
However, given that advocates of progressive transnational reform stress the 
importance of developing supranational ‘dialogic communities’ with which to 
develop common moral standards as the basis of a future ethical international order 
(Linklater 1998), it is useful to examine extant practices as they tell us much about the 
difficulties of establishing alternatives. 
 
The first point to make about the current system of global governance is that it reflects 
a complex mix of functionalist and geo-political influences. The original Bretton 
Woods institutions – the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - that emerged under American auspices 
after the Second World War, were motivated by grand strategy as much as they were 
by economic orthodoxy. Indeed, not only was the Soviet Union a credible competitor 
and a powerful spur to revitalising a seriously discredited capitalist system, but the 
precise basis upon which the post-war order was to be rebuilt was a consequence of 
                                                 
9 The literature on various aspects of globalisation is by now enormous, but a couple 
of the more useful overviews are Held et al (1999) and Scholte (2000). 
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international dialogue. Significantly, this process only involved the victorious allied 
powers and was largely conducted by technocrats and economists (see Ikenberry 
1992). While the circumstances within which the foundations of the present 
international order were established were atypical and exceptionally fluid, they 
highlight continuing impediments to more inclusive political and economic 
cooperation. The post-war order reflected the hegemonic power of the United States 
and its allies and was consequently imbued with American liberal values (Latham 
1997). The demise of the Bretton Woods system,10 and the US’s recently more 
assertive, unilateral foreign policy in the wake of the Cold War’s ending, provide a 
powerful reminder that, for all the talk of global governance, the US still has the 
capacity to decisively influence the international system.  
 
And yet there are new structures of governance that, potentially at least, may 
constrain even the US. The functional requirement for global governance has emerged 
as a consequence of the increasingly integrated, transnational patterns of economic 
activity that have grown exponentially over the last three or four decades. In 
combination with a dominant neoliberal ideology that eschews state involvement in 
economic activity, an array of private sector and intergovernmental organizations 
have assumed a central position in the new structures of governance. Most prominent 
in this regard are high profile agencies like the IMF, the G7, the World Bank and the 
like. Critics point to the powerful role played by the North in general and by the US in 
particular in directly influencing the policies and activities of these agencies in ways 
that constrain the developmental prospects of the South (Woods 1999). Less visible, 
but arguably equally important in terms of their functional and  ideological roles, are 
the myriad private sector organisations that – generally with the acquiescence of states 
– have facilitated the day to day operation of the global economy and simultaneously 
entrenched patterns of economic organisation that are driven by market forces and 
private-interests rather any nascent cosmopolitanism (see Braithwaite and Drahos 
2000).  
 
As a consequence, critics claim, contemporary modes of global governance are not 
simply incompatible with more equitable, moral or ethical patterns of economic 
distribution, but they are actively contributing to what Andrew Hurrell describes as 
the ‘deformity’ of the international system. Hurrell (2001: 41) argues that this 
deformity is found in four critical areas: first the unequal distribution of economic 
resources across the globe; second, in the fact that less powerful states are rule takers, 
not rule makers in many critical areas of political and economic activity dominated by 
the North; third, states and societies have different capacities to respond to the 
demands and challenges of the global economy; finally, international law is incapable 
of restraining the strong from acting illegally or unilaterally. While there is a good 
deal of merit in this analysis, if it is to provide an explanation of the sources of these 
deformities and impediments to reform, it is necessary to place it in a wider 
contextual framework and link it directly to the specific development of global 
capitalism.  
 
                                                 
10 One of the key consequences of this was the end of a system of regulated exchange 
rates, the concomitant growth of financial markets and the subsequent consolidation 
of neoliberal ideas. See Strange (1994). 
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The crucial insight that some forms of broadly Marxist-derived analyses have added 
to our understanding of global process is the idea that as structures of production have 
become transnational so, too, have associated forms of social relationships associated 
with governance and control. What Robert Cox (1987) described as ‘the transnational 
managerial class’ refers to the personnel of the key inter-governmental institutions 
responsible for ‘generating the policy consensus for the maintenance and defence of 
the system’. Despite a decline in the analytical purchase of class analysis for many 
observers (Hindess 1987), Cox’s claim that common perspectives, interactions, and 
collaborations have developed at an elite level amongst the controllers of economic, 
political and ideational resources has been supported by much recent scholarship (see, 
for example, Sklair 2001; Robinson and Harris 2000). The obvious, but strangely 
neglected, point to make, therefore, is that the structures of global governance operate 
in the way they do not because of some inherent teleology or even functional 
necessity, but because they serve the perceived interests of those powerful enough to 
shape them. In this context, as Murphy astutely points out, 
 
The global polity is not is not simply a superstructure responding to the interests of an 
already differentiated global ruling class. Global governance is one site, one of many 
sites, in which struggles over wealth power, and knowledge are taking place (Murphy 
2000: 799). 
 
The critical point to emphasise about these sites of global contestation is that they are 
characterised by fundamental asymmetries of power and influence. The World Trade 
Organisation, for example, is theoretically a fairly democratic organisation, but in 
reality, the poorest states do not have the wherewithal or capacity to ensure that their 
views are represented, let alone acted on when more powerful nations can use their 
wealth, expertise and leverage to determine policy outcomes (Michalopoulos  1998; 
Kapstein 1999). In such circumstances, encouraging more equitable economic 
outcomes in the South may involve going back to the future: the Westphalian world 
that many Western theorists of ethics and international relations wish to abandon in 
pursuit of greater equity may (Linklater 1998), in fact, be the only hope that many 
would-be developing economies have in achieving greater economic equality and 
development. 
 
The state and the South 
 
Given that, from a cosmopolitan perspective, states have been seen as one of the 
prime historical causes of international economic inequality it might seem strange to 
argue for a more prominent role for states. R.J. Vincent, for example, famously 
argued for a ‘cosmopolitan morality’ and against a ‘morality of states’  which, he 
claimed, is ‘founded on a doctrine of state autonomy that is no longer in touch with 
the facts of international life’. States, as far as Vincent was concerned, were primarily 
interested in protecting narrow national interests at the expense of international justice 
and equity. Consequently, Vincent argued that: 
 
If there is to be any such thing as the just distribution of the burdens and benefits of 
social cooperation on a global scale, this would seem to require not merely a 
community, but a constitution: a mature polity in and through which obligations could 
be formulated and made to stick (Vincent 1986: 119). 
 
 9
Impeccable as this logic may be, and desirable as the outcome arguably is, we have 
already seen that the reality of existing patterns of global governance mean that 
equitable outcomes are all but impossible to achieve under the prevailing order. 
Indeed, there is a de facto ‘constitution’ of the sort Vincent advocates, but it is one 
that entrenches rather than ameliorates asymmetries of influence and distributional 
outcomes through a regulatory regime that systematically advantages established 
centres of economic power (Gill 1998; Beeson and Bell forthcoming). While there is 
an argument to be made for curbing the power of the Northern states generally and the 
US in particular, as far as the South is concerned there is a compelling case to be 
made for a greater and more effective state presence and capacity, rather than its 
diminution. 
 
It is important to emphasise that my argument is not the same as the essentially 
pluralist defence of national borders advanced by Michael Walzer (1994: 34-35), 
which is based on an assumption about the limits of universal strategies for 
distributive justice. My key contention is more prosaic and practical: the historical 
record provides compelling evidence that all of the countries that have successfully 
industrialised and witnessed a concomitant rise in living standards and economic 
welfare – including current advocates of market-led development, like Britain and the 
US -  have done so with the aid of a ‘strong’ state that has provided a supportive, 
protected environment within which industrialisation can occur (Chang 2002). Given 
that there seem to be only two feasible pathways to prosperity as far as the 
impoverished parts of the planet are concerned – either everlasting aid from, and 
dependency on, the North, or indigenously inspired, sustainable economic 
development - the big lesson as far as economic development is concerned is that 
some policies are likely to be more effective than others, and that their 
implementation will require an effective state capacity.11 At a time when aid 
assistance from the developed world is either nugatory or replete with self-serving 
conditions that benefit the donor as much as the recipient,12 autonomous development 
is clearly preferable. 
 
Adrian Leftwich has persuasively argued that if the South is to overcome the 
debilitating effects of non-development and actually reduce poverty then what is 
needed is not a greater commitment to cosmopolitan ideals, nor even a less ambitious 
process of democratic reform. On the contrary, the central requirement of successful 
development, Leftwich  argues, is a ‘developmental state’, without which a transition 
from poverty is unlikely. Even more awkwardly for advocates of progressive reform, 
‘democratic politics is seldom the politics of radical economic change’ (Leftwich 
(2000: 150). In other words, even an authoritarian state that has the capacity to spur 
and guide the development process may be preferable to a more democratic one that is 
incapable of overcoming vested economic interests and political obstacles to 
‘national’ development. While critical theorists may – rightly - point to the generally  
self-serving, ideologically-loaded nature of nationalist discourses (Nussbaum 1996), 
and while the very status of ‘national economies’ may be rendered problematic by 
                                                 
11 ‘State capacity’ refers to the ability of governments to formulate and implement 
policy in a relatively autonomous manner. See Polidano (2000). 
12 It is noteworthy that the ‘Anglo-American’ economies, especially the US and 
Australia are amongst the mot miserly providers of aid amongst the rich OECD 
countries. See The Economist (2003). 
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processes of cross-border economic integration (Beeson 2001), this does not nullify 
the potentially critical role of states in underpinning the development process. The 
historical experience of East Asia – the one region of the global economy to 
experience widespread and sustained economic development outside of the ‘Western’ 
core – is testimony to the importance and efficacy of the development state model 
(see Woo-Cumings 1999). 
 
Although some of the most sophisticated visions of possible cosmopolitan democratic 
systems recognise the need to constrain and regulate capitalism as a precursor to the 
construction of more equitable and ethical world orders (Held 1995: 257), in the 
absence of such reform, the state in the South remains a potentially crucial 
emancipatory vehicle. As Mohammed Ayoob reminds us, the problem for much of the 
world still attempting to come to terms with an unfavourable, frequently traumatic 
historical integration into the global economy is not too much state authority and 
intervention, but too little: 
 
Only by approaching the Westpahlian ideal more closely can the postcolonial states 
provide a stable political order domestically and participate on a more equal footing in 
writing and rewriting the rules of the international order…only effective statehood can 
help solve the economic underdevelopment and poverty problems that plague much of 
the Third World (Ayoob 2002: 40). 
 
Achieving distributive justice will involve modifying the ‘institutional structure’ that 
underpins the current inequitable order. Although much attention has rightly focused 
on the international dimension of this problem and the manner in which it presently 
perpetuates inequitable outcomes (Pogge 1999: 293), it is also important to recognise 
that domestic institutions and the way they interact with the wider international 
system are an equally critical part of this process. In a number of countries, not only is 
there an inadequate institutional infrastructure or capacity with which to respond to 
the challenges of a predominantly neoliberal form of globalisation, but the dominant 
policy paradigm that emanates from the IFIs has the effect of delegitimising whatever 
capacity there might be (Beeson 2001). Consequently, as even the most articulate 
advocates of alternative world orders have been forced concede, the state in the South 
may need to be strengthened before it can be abandoned, because ‘only states pushed 
hard by their citizenry would have the political possibility of constraining global 
market forces’ (Falk 1995: 35). 
 
This should not be read as blanket endorsement of states or their role in the 
international system; as we shall see below, and as numerous advocates of 
cosmopolitanism have convincingly argued, they have frequently been mechanisms 
through which parochial self-interest has been realised and fundamental obstacles to 
distributive justice entrenched (Booth 1995). However, theoretical conceptions13 that 
fail to take seriously or address the specific circumstances which currently confront 
much of the world’s population, which is – rightly or wrongly – divided into national 
communities of fate, run the risk of not simply being irrelevant and highly 
Eurocentric, but of actually giving some credibility to the very economic practices 
and discourses that are arguably at the centre of inequitable patterns of distribution.  
 
                                                 
13 See Pogge (1992),  for example. 
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‘Hyper-globalisers’ like Kenichi Ohmae (1990) have long argued that national 
boundaries are impediments to the ‘efficient’ operation of market forces and inhibit 
freedom of expression for the world’s consumers. That this picture blithely ignores 
the reality of contemporary wealth distribution is of less significance here than is the 
underlying supposition that autonomous economic actors, freed from the ‘unnatural’ 
constraints of political boundaries, are the normatively preferable key to economic 
progress. It is an idea that powerfully resonates with an influential economic 
orthodoxy promoted by the IFIs and subsumed under the rubric of the ‘Washington 
consensus’.14 Significantly, the ‘cacophony of standards’ that Hoffman (1981: 164) 
assumed precluded international agreement on questions of economic organisation 
and justice, have dramatically narrowed as the neoliberal paradigm has become 
increasingly dominant. Not only is the dominant neoliberal policy discourse one that 
augurs badly for systematic economic redistribution or state led development, but is 
one that has noteworthy parallels with the emphasis on individualism in much 
cosmopolitan thinking. In both cases the stress on individual autonomy  has the, 
intentional or unintentional effect, of shifting responsibility from structures to agents, 
and from the historically determined international political economy to the individual 
as the architect of his or her own fate. 
 
Consequently, the South is left with the worst of all possible worlds: not only have 
Southern states been encouraged to take a less ‘interventionist’ role in economic 
development, but the emphasis on process and governance has shifted attention from 
the underlying, predominantly historically-determined causes of international 
economic inequality. Compounding the South’s problems has been the behaviour of 
states in the North. While the moral arguments in favour of a reduction in the power 
and prominence of the state in the ‘developed’ world are a good deal more compelling 
than they are for the South, the reality is quite different.  
 
Australia, the ‘national interest’ and international economic equality  
 
The discussion so far has been more abstract and non-specific than one might wish – a 
common problem with the much of the literature in this area. This final section 
attempts to remedy this failing by briefly considering the Australian case and drawing 
out its implications for questions of economic justice. Australia is an especially 
important example in the context of the current discussion, for if any country is well 
placed to behave ethically and with concern for the welfare of non-citizens, it is 
Australia. Although there was an ironic and cautionary undertone to Donald Horne’s 
depiction of Australia as the ‘lucky country’, by international standards, it is. Having 
displaced the original inhabitants, the current population enjoys some of the highest 
living standards in the world in what is arguably the most strategically benign 
environment on the planet. And yet, the possibility that the current generation of 
Australian policymakers might act in the interest of the Australian population as a 
whole, let alone, those from other countries, looks remote at best. 
 
In defence of the Australian government – and states everywhere, for that matter – 
political elites are not entirely to blame for their inability to represent all interests. The 
nature global processes means that different sectors of the economy, companies and 
                                                 
14 The term ‘Washington consensus’ was coined by John Williamson (1994) and 
refers to a checklist of policies considered appropriate by ‘serious’ economists. 
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even individuals are affected by international economic integration in different ways, 
and will prefer different sorts of policies as a consequence. One of the great 
attractions of neoliberalism in such circumstances is that it is far easier to ‘leave it to 
the market’ when it is not obvious how to act in ‘the national interest’. Despite this 
theoretical and practical constraint, however, the current coalition government has 
made championing the national interest a badge of honour, rather than an object of 
moral concern or practical difficulty. Indeed, so fixated is the government of John 
Howard with what it takes to be the national interest that it has released two major 
policy statements with nearly identical titles dedicated to elaborating how this might 
be achieved (Commonwealth of Australia 1997; 2003). There is no intention of 
engaging with the detail of these reports here, although there are substantial grounds 
for questioning the efficacy of the approach outlined even on ‘technical’ rather than 
ethical grounds (see Beeson 2003). The point to emphasise here is that this 
government – like many of its counterparts – believes that there is much political 
capital to be gleaned from appealing to people’s nationally-demarcated self-interest. 
To judge by the coalition’s recent electoral success and the response of the majority of 
the Australian population to the recent ‘refugee crisis’, they may be right (see Beeson 
2002). 
 
Given that the current Australian government and that of the US, with which Australia 
seeks increasingly close strategic and economic alignment, appear impervious to 
arguments based on moral or ethical claims, what does this mean for questions of 
distributive justice? At one level, it is likely to mean that the existing policy settings 
will remain in place. As far as questions of distributive justice are concerned it will 
probably mean that Australia’s support for international economic reform, in line with 
broadly neoliberal policies, and actively promoted by Australian policymakers 
through agencies like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping and 
the WTO, will continue. Yet, if the analysis of the historically determined obstacles to 
development inherent in the international political economy outlined earlier is correct, 
then such policies will do little to address questions of economic justice and 
redistribution. Given that the governments of Australia and the US are - as their 
miserly aid contributions confirm - unlikely to swayed by ethical arguments, what 
hope is there for progressive reform? Realistically, perhaps, not much. Paradoxically, 
the best hope may spring not from appeals to morality, and certainly not from 
arguments about the benefits of cosmopolitan citizenship which, however 
theoretically and normatively compelling they may be to some, including this writer, 
appear oddly divorced from the political and economic realities of life in either the 
developed or, especially, the developing world. 
 
While the arguments are complex and the evidence highly contestable, the best hope 
for progressive reform that makes development outside the core industrialised 
countries a key object of global public policy may, therefore,  stem from appeals to 
national, rather than transnational interests. Put crudely, unless there is a pay-off for 
national political elites any reformist proposals are unlikely to be taken seriously. 
There are, however, a number of factors that could be utilised to change attitudes 
toward the South and the necessity of development. Most obviously, the chronic 
political, economic and strategic instability that characterises much of the South is 
now seen to be not simply a problem for the developing world, but – as the attacks of 
September 11 brutally reminded us – potentially a problem for the rich world, too. 
Although the causes of the attacks on America are complex and beyond the scope of 
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this essay, the idea that the world could be compartmentalised into zones of peace and 
turmoil is unambiguously at an end.15 In an era of globalisation, ‘underdevelopment 
has become dangerous’ (Duffield 2002: 2). 
 
The other great potential benefit that might flow from a more orderly and 
economically expanding South is that this would benefit, perhaps primarily, the 
North. One of the most intractable current problems in the global economy is 
insufficient demand and an over-reliance on American consumers to provide a market 
of last resort. Not only is their something fundamentally immoral and inequitable 
about relying on one, already hugely over-privileged, national population to consume 
more than they already do, but this arrangement is predicated on unsustainable levels 
of private indebtedness that are vulnerable to inevitable systemic shocks.16 In such 
circumstances, opening up new markets would not only help to resolve – temporarily, 
at least – capitalism’s inherent tendency to excesses of over- and under-consumption, 
but it might help bring economic stability, development and support for the existent 
international economic order in a potentially hostile and aggrieved South. 
 
While such an outcome might seem the remotest of possibilities given the foregoing 
discussion, it is not unprecedented. The US’s pivotal role in the reconstruction of 
post-war Europe demonstrates what can be done when geopolitical and economic 
imperatives are sufficiently compelling. Nor is there any shortage of well-intentioned, 
potentially feasible ideas upon which to predicate a more sustainable and equitable 
economic order (see, for example, International Forum on Globalisation 2002). 
However, if the intention is to actually move from insular, inequitable policies that 
critics rightly see as immoral and ill-conceived, to something more sustainable and 
ethical, it is plainly not going to happen rapidly or easily. More fundamentally, it will 
of necessity be a process that is, initially at least, driven or overseen by existent 
political elites. In such circumstances, those interested in progressive economic 
outcomes might be well advised to consider strategies that could attract political 
support amongst national and - perhaps more importantly in the longer term – 
transnational elites. It may be far from ideal, but it could be a significant improvement 
on what we have. 
 
                                                 
15 See Singer and Wildavsky  (1993). For a discussion of this concept.  
16 For a brilliant analysis of the rise and potential fall of the American economy, see Brenner (2002). 
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